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aside the regulations as unconstitutional.
Nevertheless, as in Agins, the court of appeals did not find an unconstitutional taking because "the refusal of the defendants
to permit the intensive development desired by the landowner does not preclude
less intensive, but still valuable development. Accordingly, the complaint fails to
state a cause of action." MacDonald, 54
U.S.L.W. at 4783.
The Supreme Court granted the appellants petition to consider the constitutional
issue involving a regulatory taking. But, in
a decision that essentially mirrored the
lower courts reasoning, the Supreme Court
did not make a final decision on the merits
because a final determination had not been
made by the Board of Commissioners concerning the permitted use of the appellants
property, thus making the issue not ripe
for decision despite the prohibition on the
housing development. Id. at 4784.
In refusing to decide on the merits, the
Court followed Agins in permitting local
governments the power ofland use control
through regulations that limit intensive
development. The Court centered its reasoning behind two related components.
First, that the appellant must establish
that the regulation has "taken" his property or has "gone too far." Second, that any
proffered compensation is simply not just.
MacDonald, 54 U.S.L.W. at 4784.
The Court, in resolving the two components, examined the progeny of ,'taking"
cases evolving from Pennsylvania Coal Co.
v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922), through
Penn Central v. New York City, 438 U.S.
104 (1978); Agins, 447 U.S. 255 (1980),
and San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. San
Diego, 450 U.S. 621 (1981), to Williamson
Planning Commission v. Hamilton Bank,
473 U.S. __ (1985). MacDonald, 54
U.S.L.W. at 4784.
In Williamson, the appellant-developer
failed to exhaust available state avenues to
permit development or receive just compensation. MacDonald, 54 U.S.L.W. at
4784. And in Agins, the Court failed to
recognize a taking because development,
albeit less intensive, was still permitted. In
applying the facts in this action to their
past examinations, Justice Stevens went
on to conclude that as in Agins, Williamson, and San Diego Gas, the Court cannot
decide whether the Constitution requires a
monetary remedy to redress some regulatory takings because the appellant had
left the Court uncertain as to whether a
taking had occurred. MacDonald, 54
U.S.L.W. at 4785. The appellant had received the Board's determination on only
the subdivision plan, thus leaving open
the "final, definitive position regarding
how [the board] will apply the regulations

at issue to the particular land at issue." Id.
Consequently, the appellant had not established that their property had been
taken and the Board's decision was upheld.
Justice White, in his dissent, felt that
a taking did occur when the Board denied the subdivision plan. MacDonald, 54
U.S.L.W. at 4785. He refuted the majorities application of Agins, finding that the
appellant would be unable "to develop his
property in some economically beneficial
manner" because further application for
development would be futile. MacDonald,
54 U.S.L.W. at 4786. The dissent went on
to conclude that based on the facts, a taking had occurred and the Court should remand for an explanation by the court of
appeals as to the precise basis for its judgment. Id. at 4788.
The impact of this decision will favor
municipalities that seek to limit growth by
denying high density housing developments and support state regulations such
as Maryland's recently enacted Critical
Areas Legislation. Conversely, developers
will certainly feel as the dissent, that any
limit to use is a taking deserving of compensation. Nevertheless, the Court seems
to be assured of maintaining the view outlined in MacDonald as long as the 5-4 majority is maintained. And even with the recent change in the make-up of the Court,
which essentially effects the dissent's side,
it seems likely that similar land use controls will be sustained by the Court.
-Michael D. Mallinoff

Posadas de Puerto Rico Associates 0,
Tourism Co, of Puerto Rico:
SUPREME COURT UPHOLDS
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF
REGULATIONS RESTRICTING
ADVERTISING AIMED AT
PUERTO RICO RESIDENTS
In Posadas de Puerto Rico Associates v.
Tourism Co. of Puerto Rico, 54 U.S.L.W.
4956 (U.S. June 24, 1986), the Supreme
Court continued to explore the contours of
first amendment protection for commercial speech which the court had initially
recognized in 1976. The Court held that a
Puerto Rico statute and regulations restricting the advertising of casino gambling
aimed at the residents of Puerto Rico, but
not at tourists, does not facially violate
the first amendment or the due process or
equal protection guarantees of the Constitution.
Beginning in 1948, the Puerto Rico
Legislature has legalized various forms of

casino gambling, adding additional games
since the initial Games of Chance Act of
1948, Act No. 221 of May 15, 1948 (Act).
P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 15, § 71 (1972). However, the Act states that "[n]o gambling
room shall be permitted to advertise or
otherwise offer their facilities to the public
of Puerto Rico." P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 15, §
77 (1972). Furthermore, the Economic Development Administration of Puerto Rico
issued regulations which specified and expanded the scope of the prohibition of advertising of casino gambling directed at
the inhabitants of Puerto Rico and requiring prior approval by the Tourism Development Company of any casino advertising. P.R.R. & Regs. tit. 15, § 76-218
(1972).
In 1981, the Appellant Posadas de Puerto
Rico Associates, doing business as Condado Holiday Inn Hotel and Sands Casino,
filed a declaratory judgment action against
the Tourism Company in the Superior
Court of Puerto Rico, seeking a declaration that this regulatory scheme violated
appellant's commercial speech rights under the United States Constitution. The
court upheld the facial constitutionality of
the Act, narrowly construing it as "the
only advertisement prohibited by law originally is that which is contracted with an
advertising agency, for consideration, to
attract the resident to·bet at the dice, card,
roulette and bingo tables." 54 U .S.L. W. at
4958. The appellant's appeal was dismissed
by the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico as "it
[did] not present a substantial constitutional question." Id. at 4959. However, the
United States Supreme Court granted the
petition for writ of certiorari filed by Posadas de Puerto Rico Associates.
The Supreme Court, in a five to four decision, upheld the decision and narrowing
construction issued by the lower court.
Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, found two reasons for the Court's holding. First, he determined that by applying
the first amendment analysis concerning
commercial speech restrictions as dictated
by Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp.
v. Public Service Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557
(1980), the Puerto Rico regulatory scheme
passed constitutional muster. Second, the
Court, creating a new form of first amendment analysis parturient of greater enroads
on the protection of speech, held that "the
greater power to completely ban casino
gambling necessarily includes the lesser
power to ban advertising of casino gambling." 54 U.S.L.W. at 4961.
The Court reiterated that a limited form
of first amendment protection for commercial speech was first recognized in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia
Citizens Consumer Counci~ Inc., 425 U.S.
Fal4 1986rI'he Law Forum-l5

748 (1976). However, the Court stated
that the proper analysis is guided by the
four-prong test found in Central Hudson
Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service
Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557 (1980).54 U.S.L.W.
at 4960.
Applying the first prong of the Central
Hudson test, the Court held that "[t]he particular kind of commercial speech at issue
here ... concerns a lawful activity and is
not misleading or fraudulent." Id. Moving
on to the next prong, the Court found that
regulatory scheme passed muster as "the
Puerto Rico Legislature's interest in the
health, safety, and welfare of its citizens
constitutes a 'substantial' governmental interest." Id. The third prong was also found
to be met as the restrictions on commercial
speech "directly advance" the government's
asserted substantial interest by attempting
to reduce the demand for casino gambling.
Finally, the Court found that the restrictions on commercial speech, as narrowly
construed by the lower court, are no more
extensive than necessary to serve the government's interest since they "will not affect advertising of casino gambling aimed
at tourists, but will apply only to such advertising when aimed at the residents of
Puerto Rico." Id. at 4961. Thus, the Court
concluded that the regulations, as construed by the lower court, were facially
constitutional under the Central Hudson
test.
The Court then addressed the appellant's
second argument that the advertising restrictions were constitutionally defective
under the holdings in Carey v. Population
Services Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977), (striking down a ban on any "advertisement or
display" of contraceptives); and Bigelow v.
Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975), (reversing
criminal conviction based on advertisement
of an abortion clinic). However, the Court
found those cases where "the underlying
conduct that was the subject of the advertising restrictions was constitutionally protected and could not have been prohibited
by the State" distinguishable from casino
gambling which the Puerto Rico Legislature could have prohibited altogether. 54
U.S.L.W. at 4961. Thus, the Court arrived at the conclusion that "the greater
power to completely ban casino gambling
necessarily includes the lesser power to
ban advertising of casino gambling." Id.
The Court restated this new first amendment analysis more generally as "it is precisely because the government could have
enacted a wholesale prohibition of the underlying conduct that it is permissible for
the government to take the less intrusive
step of allowing the conduct, but reducing
the demand through restriction of advertising." Id. (emphasis in original). Con16- The Law Forurn/Fa/~ 1986

tinuing on, the Court observed that "[l]egislative regulation of products or activities
deemed harmful, such as cigarettes, alcoholic beverages, and prostitution has varied
from out right prohibition on the one hand
... to legalization of the product or activity
with restrictions on stimulation of its demand on the other hand." Id. "To rule out
the latter intermediate kind of response
would require more than we find in the
First Amendment," the Court concluded.
Thus, the restrictions on advertising were
upheld as constitutional.
Justice Brennan dissented, stating that
"I see no reason why commercial speech
should be afforded less protection than
other types of speech where, as here, the
government seeks to suppress commercial
speech in order to deprive consumers of
accurate information concerning lawful
activity." Id. at 4962. Justice Brennan also
disagreed with the majority's deferral "to
what it perceives to be the determination
by Puerto Rico's legislature that a ban on
casino advertising aimed at residents is
reasonable." Id. at 4963.
Justice Stevens also dissented, finding
that "Puerto Rico blatantly discriminates
in its punishment of speech depending on
the publication, audience, and words employed." Id. at 4965.
The first part of the Court's holding simply represents an extended application of
the Central Hudson, first amendment analysis for commercial speech. However, it
is the Court's introduction of "the greater
power necessarily includes the lesser power"
language into first amendment constitutional analysis which gives this case special
significance. Expansion of this new analysis, even beyond that alluded to by the
Court in its opinion, could eventually permit further erosion of the various analysis
under the freedom of speech. For example,
a content-based restriction could possibly
be disguised by the "greater includes the
lesser" analysis. It remains to be seen
whether this is the direction the new Court,
possibly under Justice Rehnquist, will take.
-Eric P. Macdonell

Frye v. Frye: MARYLAND
REAFFIRMS THE PARENT-CHILD
IMMUNITY RULE
In Frye v. Frye, 305 Md. 542 (1986), the
Court of Appeals of Maryland declined to
overturn the parent-child immunity rule
which has existed in Maryland for fifty-six
years. The court also declined to create an
exception to the rule for cases involving

the negligent operation of a motor vehicle.
In Frye, the plaintiffs, George L. Frye III,
a minor, and his mother, Barbara Frye, received injuries when the automobile in
which they were passengers went off the
road and collided with a culvert. At the
time of the occurrence, the automobile
was being operated by George L. Frye, Jr.,
who was the father and husband of the
passengers.
Suit was brought in the Circuit Court
for Prince Georges County by Barbar~
Frye, individually and as guardian and
next friend of George L. Frye, III, against
George L. Frye, Jr. for damages incurred
as a result of the defendant's negligence.
The court granted a motion to dismiss the
action as to Barbara Frye, individually, on
the ground that the doctrine ofinterspousal
immunity had been in effect upon the accrual of her cause of action and thus, relief
could not be granted. The court also dismissed the action brought on behalf of
George L. Frye, III on the ground that no
relief could be granted under the parentchild immunity rule.
Barbara Frye appealed to the court of
special appeals. In the meantime, the court
of appeals granted Mrs. Frye's request for
the court to certify the records and proceedings before a decision was rendered by
the court of special appeals.
On appeal, the plaintiff contended that
the parent-child immunity rule should be
abrogated as to torts sounding in negligence in light of the court's recent abrogation of inters pousa1immunity. See Boblitz
v. Boblitz, 296 Md. 242, 462 A.2d 506
(1983). In the alternative, the plaintiffcontended that an exception should be carved
from the parent-child immunity rule for
motor vehicle torts. The court refused to
create the exception.
Parent-child immunity, a creation of the
American judicial system, was adopted
by the court of appeals in Schneider v.
Schneider, 160 Md. 18, 152 A. 498 (1930).
As construed in Maryland, the rule bars
suits by a child against his or her parent
and by a parent against his or her child for
personal injury arising from a tort. The
court of appeals has recognized two exceptions to the rule. First, the court has held
that a minor child has a right to maintain a
cause of action against his or her parent for
"cruel and inhuman treatment or for malicious and wanton wrongs." Mahnke v.
Moore, 197 Md. 61, 68, 77 A.2d 923, 926
(1951). Secondly, the court has declined to
extend the parent-child immunity rule to
encompass a suit between an emancipated
child and a parent. Waltzinger v. Birsner,
212 Md. 107,.128 A.2d 617 (1957).
Frye is the first case, since the adoption
of parent-child immunity in Maryland, in

